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Taylor: Constitutional Law - Mining and Minerals - The Constitutionality

CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Mining and Minerals-The Constitutionality
of FLPMA's Forfeiture Provision. United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct.
1785 (1985).
Madison D. Locke forfeited ten unpatented mining claims valued at
several million dollars because he failed to comply with the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). These claims were located
on public lands.'
Locke registered his claims with the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) in accordance with the initial recording requirement of section
314(b) of FLPMA.2 On December 31, 1980, Locke filed his affidavits of
annual assessment work with the BLM Nevada State Office, one day past
the December 30 deadline set by FLPMA for annual filing. As a conse1. United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1789-90 (1985). Other persons purchased
the claims with Locke. Id.
2. Id at 1790. FLPMA states:
Recordation of Mining Claims
(a) Filing Requirements
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 1976
and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments required
by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection....
(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by section
28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of
the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the mining claim
sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
(b) Additional filing requirements
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period following
October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary
a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location,
including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill or tunnel
site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date of location of such claim,
file in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate
the claimed lands on the ground.
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely filing
The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b)
of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of
the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record
under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not all of the owners
of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 314, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982)).
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quence of 3the untimely filing, the BLM declared Locke's claims abandoned
and void.

Locke appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), alleging that section 314(c) of the Act was an unconstitutional taking of property and a denial of due process. 4 After losing his appeal to the IBLA,
Locke sued in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.6
The district court granted Locke a summary judgment. The district court
due process by creating an
held that section 314(c) denied constitutional
6
irrebuttable presumption of abandonment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that Congress may provide that holders of unpatented mining claims who
fail to comply with the requirements of FLPMA shall forfeit their claims.7
The Court determined that Congress intended to void claims which were
not filed prior to December 31 and, therefore, evidence of intent to abandon was irrelevant. The Court also reasoned that "substantial compliance" with the filing deadline was insufficient.9 Finally, the Court found
that the recordation laws, when construed as forfeiture provisions, afforded adequate due process. ° The Court concluded that mere failure to file
on time extinguishes a claim."
BACKGROUND

Mining Claims
Congress enacted FLPMA in response to a number of federal land
policy problems including a lack of centralized information and numerous
stale claims. Prior to the Act, a sale of federal land required an arduous
title search in county recorders' offices for any outstanding claims. 2
claims encumbered state land records before
Several million unpatented
3
the passage of FLPMA.'

Under section 314 of FLPMA, the owner of an unpatented lode or
placer mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976 must meet two
3. Brief for the Appellants at 7, United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785 (1985)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. The claims were located before Congress passed the Common Varieties Act of 1955, prospectively barring location of claims for gravel, building
materials or other "common varieties." 30 U.S.C. § 611. The Lockes were informed by a district
office of the Bureau of Land Management that the filing deadline was December 31st. Appellees' Answering Brief at 5, United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785 (1985).
4. Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at 8.
5. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1790.
6. Id at 1791.
7. Id at 1799. Appellees had three years to familiarize themselves with the statute.
Id. at 1800.
8. Id at 1795-96.
9. Id. at 1796.
10. Id at 1798-1800.
11. Id at 1796.
12. Strauss, Mining Claimson PublicLands:A Study of InteriorDepartmentProcedures,
1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 215-219 (1974).
13. Id at 192. During the mid-nineteenth century different mining districts had individual rules on the matter of acquiring and holding a mining claim. Early mining law embodied the traditions of custom and local administration of mining claims. Id. at 186.
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general requirements. 4 First, under subsection (a) an owner must file a
notice of intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work
performed on the claim within three years of October 21, 1976. The notice
and the affidavit of assessment work performed must be refiled each year
thereafter "prior to December 31.' ' 5 The second stipulation, found in section 314(b), is an initial recordation requirement.' 6 Section 314(c) provides
that failure to meet the requirements of either sections 314(a) or 314(b)
"shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim.., by the owner."" Thus, Congress intended section 314(c) of
FLPMA to extinguish all claims for which a timely filing had not been
made.' 8
Due Process
An unpatented mining claim is entitled to due process protection
because it is property in the fullest sense of the word.' 9 In Locke, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution authorizes Congress
to provide for the forfeiture of mining claims, and if so whether FLPMA
afforded the requisite constitutional protection.
The fifth amendment proscribes the taking of property without just
compensation and requires reasonable notice of the proceedings that result
in the taking.2 0 In Locke, the Court discussed the due process aspects2 of
two methods of taking: the irrebutable presumption and forfeiture. '
A statute which creates a legislative presumption of one fact from
proof of another can meet due process requirements only when there is
an essential connection between them. 22 The Court in Vlandis v. Kline
struck down a Connecticut statute as violative of the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.2 3 Under the statute, a student
classified as a nonresident could never receive resident status for tuition
purposes at state universities.2 4 The Court held that the statute resulted
in an impermissible irrebuttable presumption. 5
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was limited as a generally used
approach in Weinberger v. Salfi. 26 The Court upheld a regulation requiring marriage at least nine months before the wage earner's death in order
for the surviving wife and stepchildren to be eligible for social security
14. 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982).
15. Id § 1744(a).
16. Id § 1744(b). A copy of the official notice of location or certificate of location must
be registered with the BLM within three years of FLPMA's enactment. Id.
17. Id § 1744(c).
18. United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1794 (1985).
19. Wilbur v. United States ex reL Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930).
20. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 282 (1925).
21. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1797-1801.
22. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973).
23. Id at 452.
24. Id at 443.
25. Id at 452.
26. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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benefits. 2 The presumption was that the couple had entered into marriage
for the fraudulent purpose of obtaining social security benefits. 28 In
upholding the regulation, the Court signaled an intent to narrow the application of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine to areas involving fun29
damental rights.

Forfeiture was the second method of taking property addressed by
the Court in Locke.3 0 The seminal case on this point was Texaco, Inc. v.
Short.' In that case the Indiana Legislature enacted the Mineral Lapse
Act to weed out stale mineral interests which had not been used for twen-

ty years. 3 2 The Court held that states may "condition retention of a prop-

erty right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time. "33
The absence of specific notice did not invalidate the self-executing feature
of the 5statute2 ' The situation parallels the running of a statute of limita2
tions.

In Texaco, the Court set out a three part test to determine when an
automatic forfeiture provision is constitutionally permissible. First, one
must determine "whether Congress is authorized to 'provide that property
rights ... shall be extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative

action required by the' statute." 6 A legislature generally has this power
if the constraint or duty imposed is reasonable and is designed to attain
legitimate legislative goals. 7

Second, one must look to the substantive effect of the statute. Congress is barred from enacting a statute which infringes on constitutionally protected rights.3 8 When property is subject to forfeiture, constitutional
protection must be found in the fifth amendment's prohibition of the taking of private property without just compensation. 9
Finally, a statute must provide individuals with constitutionally adequate process.' 0 Generally, this is satisfied if the legislature enacts and
publishes the law, and gives the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to
familiarize themselves and comply with its terms. 4 ' The Court in Texaco

noted that individuals are charged with the knowledge of statutes that
27. Id at 754-56.

28. Id at 767-68.
29.

NOWAK, ROTUNDA,

& YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

30. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1797-1801.
31. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).

553-54 (2d ed. 1983).

32. Id at 518. The statute contained a two-year grace period during which mineral in-

terests could be saved by filing a claim in the recorder's office.
33. Id at 529.
34. Id at 535-36.
35. Id at 536. Due process does not require notice to one adversely affected by the
running of a statute of limitations. Id
36. United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1797 (1985) (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short,
454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982)).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

United States v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1797-98.
Id at 1799.
Id
Id at 1799-1800.
Id at 1800.
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affect them. 2 Specific notice to an individual is not required if the legislature enacts a law uniformly affecting all citizens and sets out the conditions that will result in a forfeiture. 3 The Court found no procedural defect
in the Indiana statute." The Court in Locke followed the foundation laid
in Texaco when
it decided the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision
4
of FLPMA.

1

THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Locke, the Court rejected the district court's view that the Act
created an irrebuttable presumption.4 6 The Court reasoned that nothing
in FLPMA indicated that Congress was concerned with a claimant's intent to abandon his claim. 7 Section 314(c) provides that "failure to file
such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining
claim. .... "4 The Court concluded from the language of the statute that
there was no proof that Congress presumed a claimant actually intended
to abandon the claim by failing to make a timely filing. 49 Thus, the Court
avoided applying the standard tests for irrebuttable presumptions. The
Court then scrutinized the constitutionality of section 314(c) of the Act
as a forfeiture provision. 50
The Court followed the Texaco three part test in determining whether
the forfeiture provision was unconstitutional." The Court said that Congress may impose reasonable restrictions to further legitimate legislative
goals by conditioning retention of vested property rights on the performance of affirmative duties.52 According to the Court, this power is particularly broad in cases such as Locke, in which the interests are a unique
form of property. The United States owns the underlying fee title to the
public domain and therefore maintains broad powers over the terms and
conditions of land use, leasing, and acquisition. 3
42. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 532.
43. Id. at 537.

44. Id at 538.
45. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1797.
46. Id
47. Id The Act does not expressly state an intention to depart from the common law
term-of-art meaning of abandonment. The common law of mining has traditionally distinguished between abandoment and forfeiture. Abandonment requires an intent to abandon,
whereas forfeiture merely requires noncompliance with the law. 2 AM. L. MINING § 46.01[2]
- [3][a (2d ed. 1985). Interpreting the Act as following the traditional use of the term abandonment (in mining law), the District Court invalidated the Act because it created an irrebuttable presumption. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1794. "As a forfeiture provision, [section] 314(c)
is not subject to the individualized hearing requirement of such irrebuttable presumption
cases as Vlandis v. Kline, or Cleveland Bd of Education v. LaFleur." Locke, 105 S.Ct. at
1797 (citations omitted).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1982).
49. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1797.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id
Id See supra text accompanying notes 36-42 (three part Texaco test).
Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1797.
Id at 1798.
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The Court found that the Act's purpose, to rid federal lands of stale
mining claims and to provide for current information on claim status, is
found that 314(c) is a reasonable means of attaining
legitimate. It also
5
FLPMA's goals.

Next the Court addressed the question of whether the forfeiture provision of the Act resulted in a "taking" of private property. It determined
that reasonable regulatory restrictions on property rights do not "take"
private property when an individual must merely comply with reasonable
is not required to compensate an individual for
regulations.55 Congress
5 6
his own neglect.

As the final part of the Texaco test, the Court considered whether
FLPMA provided a constitutionally adequate process to alter the substantive rights of claim holders. The Act gave individuals a three year period
to familiarize themselves with the published law and to comply with its
requirements. The Court, again under the Texaco framework, found this
sufficient. 7
Apart from the Texaco test, the Court found that "substantial compliance" with the filing deadline was not enough. It reasoned that the filing deadline must be strictly enforced to have any substance, even though
the result is sometimes harsh. According to the Court, "any less rigid
' 58standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates."
ANALYSIS

The Court upheld the constitutionality of FLPMA by analyzing the
Act as a forfeiture statute. 9 It summarily rejected the irrebuttable presumption doctrine that was the basis of the lower court's opinion.6 0 The
Act could have withstood a due process challenge on either ground, and
the Court should have addressed them both. While the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine may be of little force, it has not been wholly rejected,
and the Court should have faced the issue squarely.
The Court circumvented Locke's irrebuttable presumption argument
by interpreting section 314(c) as a forfeiture provision. 6' The Court concluded from the language of the statute that Congress did not presume
that a claimant actually intended to abandon the claim by failing to make
a timely filing.62 It is undenied, however, that FLPMA employs the term
"abandoned" rather than "forfeited." Further, while the original Senate
version of the forfeiture statute called late filed claims "abandoned and
54. Id. at 1798-99.
55. Id at 1799.

56. Id.
57. Id at 1800. The Texaco Court upheld an Indiana statute with only a two year grace
period. The Indiana statute contained a similar regulation of mineral interests. Texaco, 454
U.S. at 533-34.
58. Locke, 105 S. Ct. at 1796 (citing United States v. Boyle, 105 S.Ct. 687, 692 (1984)).
59. Id. at 1797-1801.
60. Id at 1797.
61. Id
62. Id.
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void,' '63 the final version merely says that late filing shall constitute an
abandonment. This deletion suggests that Congress intended to create
not a forfeiture statute, but one of abandonment. Arguably, Congress used
the term abandonment as it is commonly understood in the field of mining.64 If this usage was employed, the statute indeed presumes an intent
to abandon.6 5 Therefore, the Court should have addressed the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine.
Had the Court chosen to apply the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
however, FLPMA could still withstand attack under the analysis of Salfi.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was employed to invalidate the
statutes in both Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur" and Vlandis
v. Kline.67 The school board rule in LaFleuraffected the fundamental right
to bear children.6 8 Vlandis dealt with education 6

9

which the Court has

70
found to be an important, although not a fundamental, right.

The irrebuttable presumption doctrine did not apply in Salfi.71Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Salfi distinguished most of the earlier cases on the
grounds that they involved interests with a "constitutionally protected
status. 7'2 The right to receive social security benefits at issue in Salfi is
not a fundamental liberty or property interest recognized by the Constitution.7 3 Congress may reasonably conclude that generalized rules are appropriate when a statute does not deal with constitutionally protected
74
rights. Any imprecision is justified by ease and certainty of operation.
The property interest in Locke, which the Court identifies as the right
to a flow of income from property, is an economic interest. 75 This interest
is more closely related to the interest in social security benefits in Salfi
than it is to the fundamental right to bear children or the importance attributed to education. The Court could still have upheld the constitutionality of FLPMA against an irrebuttable presumption challenge because
Locke's interest was not a fundamental right.
63. S.507, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 311 (1975) originally stated that a claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall be void."
64. See supra note 47.
65. See Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 472 (1983).
66. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
67. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
68. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40.
69. Vlandis, 412 U.S. 441.
70. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
71. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772-73.
72. Id. at 771-73.
73. Id
74. Id. at 784-85.
75. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1798. In CaroleneProducts, the Court deferred to legislative

judgment on an economic issue. The Court said that regulatory legislation dealing with commercial transactions will not be found unconstitutional without proof that it does not rest
on a rational basis. In a footnote, the Court pointed out that where legislation deals with
rights protected by the Constitution, particularly those protected by the Bill of Rights, the
presumption of constitutionality might be narrower. United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This reinforces the difference between the economic interest
at stake in Locke and the rights affected in LaFleur and Vlandis.
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The Court, however, correctly dealt with the closely related question
of substantial compliance. Justice Stevens argued that the untimely filing did not diminish the importance of Congress's purposes and that
76
Locke's acts were entirely consistent with the statutory ends. Thus,
77
substantial compliance would not frustrate the intent of Congress. The
limitamajority reasoned, however, that "[fliling deadlines, like statutes of
tions, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily ...but if the concept
of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced.'11
The dissent would have the Court do equity.7 9 Locke had actively
operated his claim for twenty years and had earned four million dollars
from gravel sales. 80 Depriving Locke of his livelihood because he missed
a filing deadline by merely one day seems excessively harsh. The majority's concern, though, was that a less rigid standard would encourage a
lax attitude towards filing deadlines.8' Further, Locke could easily have
protected his interest in the claims by informing himself of the filing
deadline and filing the required papers. He cannot complain because he
was not vigilant in asserting his rights.8 2
The statute creates a "trap for the unwary '83 only if it is impermissibly
vague. A vague statute would violate due process by giving insufficient
notice of what is required. 4 The Court dealt with the notice requirement
as part of the third prong of the Texaco test.8 5
Disagreement arose over whether or not the Act provided adequate
notice.8 6 The Justices agreed that publication of the statute provided at
least some notice. The dissenting Justices argued, however, that 87the filing deadline, "prior to December 31," was impermissibly vague.
76. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1806 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
77. Id. at 1808.
78. Id at 1796 (Marshall, J., for the Court).
79. Id at 1808 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Thus, appellees lost their entire livelihood
for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of Congress, and because of the hypertechnical
construction of a poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow 'filings' far
beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but then interprets inflexibly in others." Id
80. Id at 1803 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. Id at 1796 (Marshall, J., for the Court).
82. Id. at 1799.
83. Id at 1808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531-33 (1982); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
85. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1799-1801. All Justices agreed that FLPMA met the first and
second prongs of the Texaco test. "[Jiust as a state may create a property interest that is
entitled to constitutional protection, the state has the power to condition retention of that
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the interest." Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982). Further, "regulation
"Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1799. A number
of property rights does not 'take' private property ....
of decisions establish the authority of the state to condition the retention of a property right
on the performance of an act within a limited time period. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons,
377 U.S. 902 (1964); Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
86. Compare Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1799 with id at 1803 (Powell, J., dissenting) and id
at 1805 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id at 1804 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens said that Congress could not have intended for the
deadline to end "one day before the end of the calendar year that has been
recognized since the amendment of the Julian calendar in 8 B.C.... "88
Locke lost his entire livelihood because the Court's construction of the
statute, according to Justice Stevens, "creates a trap for the unwary." '89
After the enactment and publication of the statute, however, Locke
had ample time to familiarize himself and comply with the terms of the
Act.90 Locke met the initial filing requirement; thus he presumably knew
of the Act and his need to inquire into the Act's demands. 9 1
The dissent argued that the enactment of the statute did not provide
sufficient notice because the "statutory deadline [for filing] is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional requirements.'92 The statute reads that filing must occur "prior to December 31." This, according to the dissent,
creates uncertainty as to when the documents must be filed. This uncertainty arises because there is a natural tendency to interpret the language
as "by the end of the calendar year. 93 The dissent further noted that the
BLM regulations interpreting the statute do not use the language of the
statute "prior to December 31." Instead, they read "on or before December
30." The dissent questioned the Court's conclusion that the language is
plain, reasoning that, if the language was plain, the BLM would feel no
9
need to change it.

4

This argument fails when confronted by past decisions. Fixed dates
are often essential to accomplish necessary results.95 When faced with a
deadline, which is inherently arbitrary, the Court must, at least in a civil
case, apply the date fixed by statute.9 A literal reading of Congress' words
is generally the only proper reading with respect to filing deadlines. 97 When
one reads the statute literally, the filing deadline is December 30, because
the statute says "prior to December 31." The majority thus correctly
determined that the filing deadline was clear and not vague.
CONCLUSION

The Court found that section 314(c) of FLPMA is a forfeiture provision which presumes nothing about a claimant's intent. The Court applied
the Texaco test and correctly determined that FLPMA met all the due
process requirements of a forfeiture statute. Where a statute provides for
forfeiture, substantial compliance is not sufficient. The burden is proper88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1808.
Id at 1800 (Marshall, J., for the Court).
Id..
Id. at 1802 (Powell, J. dissenting).
Id at 1805-06 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id.. at 1807
United States v. Boyle, 105 S.Ct. 687, 692 (1984).
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1792.
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ly placed on the party affected by the statute to inform himself of the
statutory requirements and comply with them.
The Court could have upheld FLPMA using the irrebuttable presumption analysis as limited by Salfi. It ignored the common usage of the term
"abandonment" in the mining field. This emphasizes the Court's intention to narrow the use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis to situations fitting squarely within the framework of Vlandis.
KARl
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